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Understanding the Obstacles to the Recognition and Enforcement of
U.S. Judgments Abroad
Samuel P. Baumgartner*

I. Introduction
Questions of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments have entered center
stage. Recent empirical work suggests that there has been a marked increase in the frequency
with which U.S. courts are asked to recognize and enforce foreign judgments.1 The U.S.
litigation surrounding a multibillion-dollar Ecuadoran judgment against Chevron indicates that
the stakes in some of these cases can be high indeed.2 Conversely, we learn that U.S. injunctions
in patent cases, an area where enforcement abroad is likely to be particularly tricky, nevertheless
include a substantial number of cases in which U.S. judgments will need to be recognized and
enforced abroad to be effective.3 Although we do not know for sure, the same may well be true
of U.S. judgments in subject-matter areas other than patent law. This rising importance of
questions of judgments recognition has not been lost on lawmakers. In November of 2011, the
Subcommittee on Courts, Commercial and Administrative Law of the U.S. House of
Representatives’ Judiciary Committee held hearings on whether to adopt federal legislation on
the question of recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments in the United States.4 And at the
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1

See Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher Whytock, The New Multipolarity in Transnational Litigation:
Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments, and Foreign Law, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 31, 35-36 (2011).
2

See, e.g., Patton Boggs LLP v. Chevron Corp, 683 F.3d 397 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (upholding district court’s
decision, among others, that Ecuadoran plaintiffs’ U.S. firm had failed to state a claim with regard to its allegation
that defendant’s counsel had tortuously interfered with its contractual relationship with the plaintiffs); Chevron
Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, __ S.Ct. __ (2012) (reversing district court’s injunction
against Ecuadoran judgment holders preventing them from enforcing their judgment anywhere outside the Republic
of Ecuador); Chevron Corp v. Donziger, __ F.Supp.2d ___ (S.D.N.Y 2012) (granting partial summary judgment for
Chevron on its complaint based on RICO and other fraud causes of action against Ecuadoran lead plaintiffs and their
attorneys, dismissing affirmative defenses based on res judicata and collateral estoppel of Ecuadoran judgment).
3

See Marketa Trimble, Cross-Border Injunctions in U.S. Patent Cases and their Enforcement Abroad, 13
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 331, 335-45 (2009).
4

See United States House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts,
Commercial and Administrative Law, Hearing on: Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Tue.,
11/15/2011 (available at: http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_11152011_2.html). A year earlier, Congress
entered the area for the narrow purpose of “prohibit[ing] recognition and enforcement of foreign defamation
judgments and certain foreign judgments against the providers of interactive computer services” in U.S. courts
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Hague Conference of Private International Law, the project – begun in the 1990s and later
shelved – to enter into a world-wide convention on the recognition of foreign judgments, has just
been put on the agenda for further study.5
One of the central questions in determining the relevant U.S. interests in support of (or in
opposition to) both a federal judgments project and the negotiations at The Hague as well as
specific proposed provisions within them is how U.S. judgments are currently treated abroad.
The answer is simply: It depends. On the one hand, there are jurisdictions that liberally recognize
and enforce U.S. judgments coming their way, at least as a general matter. At the other end of the
spectrum, there are a number of countries where U.S. judgments are for the most part given no
effect. In addition, the prospect of recognizing and enforcing a U.S. judgment abroad may
depend on the domicile or the nationality of the defendant, the subject matter of the suit, the type
of damages awarded, and the way the proceedings leading to the U.S. judgment were conducted.6
In this Article, I focus on the major obstacles U.S. judgment holders have encountered
abroad as a matter of foreign recognition doctrine and to analyze the reasons underlying those
obstacles. Focusing on doctrinal obstacles is not, of course, a substitute for careful empirical
study. However, it provides a good basis for understanding what types of problems U.S.
judgment holders are likely to encounter and why. I propose that we distinguish those obstacles
on the basis both of the purpose they are meant to serve and of the way in which they have
developed. Doing so, I think, represents an important step toward understanding how the
effectiveness of U.S. judgments abroad can potentially be improved, be it through negotiations at
The Hague or in other ways. Thus, I submit that the doctrinal obstacles identified pursue three
distinct purposes: the protection of the sovereignty of the recognition state; the protection of
other public interests of the recognition state; and the protection of the party against whom the
U.S. judgment is to be used from what the recognition state views as substandard legal norms or

unless certain minimum requirements are met. See Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Established
Constitutional Heritage (SPEECH) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-223, 124 Stat. 2380 (2010).
5

See Hague Conference of Private International Law, Council on General Affairs and Policy of the
Conference (17-20 April 2012), Conclusions and Recommendations Adopted by the Council 3, available at
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=progress.listing&cat=5 (“the Council decided to establish a Working Group
whose initial task shall be to prepare proposals for consideration by the Special Commission in relation to provisions
for inclusion in a future instrument relating to recognition and enforcement of judgments, including jurisdictional
filters”). The earlier effort to negotiate a world-wide treaty on jurisdiction and the recognition of judgments did,
however, produce a treaty with a much narrower scope. See Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30,
2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294.
6

See Samuel P. Baumgartner, How Well Do U.S. Judgments Fare in Europe?, 40 GEO WASH. INT’L L.
REV. 173 (2008) [hereinafter Baumgartner, U.S. Judgments]. See also Linda J. Silberman, Some Judgments on
Judgements: A View from America, 19 KING’S L.J. 235 (2008).
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procedural treatment.7 Given that most of the issues arising in this country’s recognition practice
regarding foreign money judgments appear to focus on the protection of the interests of the
parties of the original litigation,8 it may come as a surprise that sovereign and other public
interests still underlie many of the doctrinal obstacles to the recognition of U.S. judgments
abroad, including in areas where we have long lost sight of sovereignty concerns in the United
States.
I further suggest that we separate the doctrinal obstacles encountered by U.S. judgments
holders abroad into two categories on the basis of how they have developed. The first category is
the more obvious one. It consists of doctrines that were set in place some time ago and that apply
to all judgments from jurisdictions with which the relevant country does not have a recognition
treaty, including the United States. The second category is more subtle. It consists of slight
changes to existing recognition doctrine that some foreign jurisdictions have adopted specifically
in reaction to litigation in the United States. As we shall see, however, it is difficult to cleanly
separate these two categories because reactions to U.S. litigation have not only led to the second
category of doctrinal obstacles, but also influenced, to some degree, the interpretation of the first.
But the realization that this second category exists leads to the question why courts abroad would
occasionally interpret existing recognition requirements so as to generate new pockets of
doctrine that prevent the recognition and enforcement of U.S. judgments in certain
circumstances. The reason, I argue, is that recognition law is influenced, as is all law applicable

7

For a more general discussion of some of the interests a jurisdiction may need to balance in crafting its
recognition regime see, for example, I/2 REINHOLD GEIMER & ROLF A. SCHÜTZE, INTERNATIONALE
URTEILSANERKENNUNG 1367-79 (1984); Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald Trautman, Recognition of Foreign
Adjudications: A Survey and Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1603-05 (1968).
8

See, e.g., Evans Cabinet Corp. v. Kitchen Intern., Inc., 593 F.3d 135, 143-148 (1st Cir. 2010) (remanding
to determine whether Quebec court had personal jurisdiction over defendant); Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233
F.3d 473, 476-82 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that English judgment was not “’rendered under a system that does not
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law’” according to
Illinois Uniform Money Judgments Recognition Act); Presley v. N.V. Masureel Veredeling, 370 S.W.3d 425, 43134 (Tex. App. 2012) (upholding lower court’s finding that Belgian judgment neither violated arbitration agreement
nor arose from a system that failed to provide due process); EOS Transport, Inc. v. Agri-Source Fuels LLC, 37
So.3d 349, 352-55 (Fla. App. 2010) (affirming lower court’s decision that Canadian court did not have personal
jurisdiction over defendant); Java Oil Ltd. v. Sullivan, 86 Cal. Reptr.3d 177, 184-87 (Cal. App. 2008) (holding that
award by Gibraltar court of attorney’s fees does not violate California public policy). But see, e.g., Yahoo! Inc. v. La
Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1220-24 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing, but ultimately
finding lack of ripeness of, question of whether French judgment violated First Amendment and thus California
public policy); Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 239-51 (Md. 1997) (refusing enforcement of British libel
judgment for violation of First Amendment freedom of speech); Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc., 585
N.Y.S.2d 661, 662-65 (N.Y. Sup. 1992) (same).
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to transnational litigation,9 by four factors that tend to have implications beyond the interests of
the parties in a particular case: power politics, domestic legal and procedural culture, the
preferences of groups and individuals inside and outside the state apparatus, and relevant
information asymmetries. In what follows, I address these matters in turn. My expertise is with
the recognition of U.S. judgments in Europe. But I will add occasional references to other
countries where I know about them.

II. Concerns for the National Sovereignty of the Recognition State
Concerns for the national sovereignty of the recognition state are the primary reason why
countries today have rules on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the first
place. With the advent of the nation state in the 17th century, the view quickly spread that judicial
judgments are manifestations of state power, the effects of which stop at water’s edge.10 In order
for a judgment to have any effects outside the rendering state’s territory, then, it needs first to be
granted those effects by the other states on their respective territories. The Dutch comity doctrine
of the 17th century, which strongly influenced recognition practice in the United States,11
softened this approach with a general policy (although not an obligation) in favor of recognizing
foreign judgments. But European nationalism in the 19th century strengthened the view that the
decision whether or not to grant foreign judgments any effects was entirely in the hands of the
recognition state.12 Thus, many of the continental European jurisdictions adopted a rule of not
recognizing foreign judgments while dealing with the practical difficulties arising from this rule
by negotiating more liberal approaches in bilateral, and later multilateral, treaties with most of
their trading partners.13 In a number of nations, this is still the general approach today. Since the
United States has not concluded any treaties in this area, however, U.S. judgments for the most

9

Cf. Samuel P. Baumgartner, Is Transnational Litigation Different?, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1297,
1371-78 (2004) (identifying factors distinguishing transnational from domestic litigation) [hereinafter Baumgartner,
Transnational Litigation].
10

See, e.g., DIETER MARTINY, III/1 HANDBUCH DES INTERNATIONALEN ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHTS 14-16

11

See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-66 (1895).

(1984).

12

See, e.g., MARTINY, supra note 10, at 16-21 & 26-27. As a result, Italy, for instance, made recognition
more difficult to obtain in the late 19th century, whereas Norway dropped its recognition-friendly code provision
soon thereafter in favor of a general rule of non-recognition, still in force today. See id. at 27 n.161.
13

See, e.g., id. at 16-18; SAMUEL P. BAUMGARTNER, THE PROPOSED HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION
(2003).

AND JUDGMENTS: TRANSATLANTIC LAWMAKING FOR TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 54-55
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part have no effects in these countries. This is true, among others, in Austria, China, Denmark,
Finland, Norway, Sweden, and, to a lesser extent, in the Netherlands and Russia.14
As in the United States, however, courts and lawmakers in other jurisdictions have long
since abandoned this approach in favor of giving effect to foreign judgments under certain
conditions, even in the absence of a treaty obligation to do so. The conditions for recognition
thus spelled out look very much alike, at least at a general level. They usually begin with the
requirement that the judgment to be recognized be final in the rendering state. They then include
a test for the personal jurisdiction of the rendering state; a test for proper service of process;
some sort of due process test; and a public policy exception (including an opportunity to argue
fraud). In addition, a number of countries require reciprocity and a few add some version of a
choice of law test.15 However, if we look more closely, we again see national sovereignty
interests at play in the way these tests have been applied in some jurisdictions.
The primary purpose of the requirement of proper service, for instance, is everywhere the
same: to ensure that the defendant had adequate notice and an opportunity to defend.16 However,
service of process has also been viewed in continental Europe, at least since the 17th century, as

14

In many of these countries, the rule against recognizing foreign judgments has softened over the years.
For instance, almost all of them will recognize and enforce foreign judgments in certain matters of family law;
Norway and Sweden will recognize judgments from courts that based their jurisdiction on a forum selection
agreement between the parties; Finnish courts will recognize judgments in cases that could not have been brought in
Finland for lack of personal jurisdiction or that pertain to property rights on immovable property located abroad; and
the Dutch courts have interpreted their respective statute to proscribe the enforcement, but not the recognition, of
foreign judgments, in addition to permitting enforcement in certain family law matters and in cases in which the
defendant accepted the rendering court’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., Michel J. Moser, People’s Republic of China, in
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN ASIA 85, 94 (Michael Pryles ed., 2006); Gerhard Walter & Samuel P. Baumgartner, The
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments Outside the Scope of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, in
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE BRUSSELS AND LUGANO
CONVENTIONS [hereinafter RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT] 1, 9-10 &17-18 (Gerhard Walter & Samuel P.
Baumgartner eds., 2000). In Russia, the rule against recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments outside a treaty
obligation to the contrary has more recently been overcome in a number of courts if reciprocity is otherwise
established. See, e.g., Dmitry Kurochkin, Russia, in 2 ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS at 5-6 (2011 update).
15

At least in Europe, a preference rule in case of inconsistent adjudications in the same matter by tribunals
from different states is also usually cast in terms of a recognition requirement. On all of these conditions for
recognition, see, for example, Friedrich K. Juenger, The Recognition of Money Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 13-26 & 31-37 (1988); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 7, at 1610-1665; Walter
& Baumgartner, supra note 14, at 21-35. Note that the French Cour de cassation abolished the French choice of law
test in a 2007 decision involving the recognition of a U.S. judgment. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
16

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §482(2)(b)
(1987); Juenger, supra note 15, at 20; Walter & Baumgartner, supra note 14, at 24-25.
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an exercise of governmental power.17 It contains, after all, an order to the defendant to participate
in proceedings against him in a court of law, lest there will be serious consequences. In the
United States, we may have lost sight of this aspect of service after decades of revisions to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their state counterparts permitting and then prioritizing
service by private parties and through mail.18 But in other countries, this has remained an
important aspect of service, and the rule against exercising governmental power on the territory
of another state without that state’s consent is indirectly enforced at the recognition stage. As a
result, service of process by foreign officials and private individuals, whether in person or
through the use of mail or by electronic means, often results in the non-recognition of the
resulting judgment where this is not an accepted form of service in the recognition state, be it by
virtue of the Hague Service Convention and applicable reservations to it,19 or according to the
domestic law of the recognition state where the Hague Service Convention does not apply.20
Similar problems can arise with regard to activities related to discovery. U.S.-style
discovery may be unknown abroad, but the gathering of evidence in civil litigation is not.21 In
civil law countries, however, the decision what evidence must be gathered and how is made by
the court, upon request by the attorneys. The court or, in some countries, a court-appointed

17

See, e.g., THOMAS BISCHOFF, DIE ZUSTELLUNG IM INTERNATIONALEN RECHTSVERKEHR IN ZIVIL- ODER
HANDELSSACHEN 174-75 (1997); JÖRG PAUL MÜLLER & LUZIUS WILDHABER, PRAXIS DES VÖLKERRECHTS 282 (2d
ed. 1982).
18

See, e.g.¸ FED. R. CIV. PROC. 4(c) & (d); GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 817 (4th ed. 2007); Honorable Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Service By Mail – Is the
Stamp of Approval From the Hague Convention Always Enough?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 167 (Summer
1994) (suggesting that “it is clear that an important function of service of process is to give notice” and that [t]hat
task can be performed efficiently and inexpensively through the use of postal channels”).
19

See Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, Nov. 15, 1965, 20
U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Hague Service Convention].
20

See, e.g., 120 BGHZ 305 (1992) (Germany) (upholding decision below that service by international mail
on the German defendant in violation of the Hague Service Convention rendered the resulting South Carolina
judgment non-recognizable, even though the documents adequately informed the defendant of the proceedings in
South Carolina in sufficient time to defend); BGE 135 III 623 (2009) (Switz.) (reversing lower court’s decision to
recognize an Italian judgment as against Art. 27(2) of the Lugano Convention and the Swiss reservation to Article
10(a) of the Hague Service Convention because the Italian court had served the Swiss defendant by sending
summons and complaint through international mail, even though the defendant had actually received the served
documents in a timely manner). But see 122 III 439 (1996) (Switz.) (holding that lower court’s granting of
enforcement of U.S. judgment was not arbitrary, despite service in violation of applicable international treaty, since
defendant had entered general appearance and had been properly represented by counsel).
21

See, e.g., UGO MATTEI, TEEMU RUSKOLA & ANTONIO GIDI, SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW 756-809
(7 ed. 2009).
th
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official also questions the witnesses.22 This active role of the court in the process of gathering
evidence long ago led to the view that the taking of evidence represents the exercise of sovereign
power that cannot be extended to the territory of a foreign sovereign without that sovereign’s
consent.23 Such consent has traditionally been given in response to a letter rogatory or through
the means identified in an applicable international treaty, such as the Hague Evidence
Convention.24 The fact that the conduct of discovery has largely been delegated to the attorneys
in the U.S. discovery process has not been viewed abroad as rendering discovery any less of a
governmental act. After all, unjustified non-compliance with discovery requests will result in an
order to compel and in sanctions from the court if the order is not complied with.25 Judgments
emanating from proceedings involving discovery from or on foreign territory may thus be
refused to be recognized as well.26 The difficulty, of course, is in knowing which precise acts in
the process of discovering evidence located abroad are considered to represent the exercise of a
sovereign act on foreign territory and thus may have adverse consequences for the recognition of
a resulting judgment. Such acts certainly include the actual conducting of depositions and
inspections on foreign territory. But they may also include requests and orders directed at
nonparties from abroad to appear for depositions in the United States and to bring along
documents for inspection. In some instances, even the direction of such requests and orders at
foreign parties in U.S. litigation may be seen as the exercise of a governmental act on the
territory of the state of the parties’ domicile.27
In sum, concerns for the protection of national sovereignty are alive and well as a pillar
of the law on the recognition on foreign judgments in a number of foreign countries, and they
lurk in areas where U.S. lawyers may not have anticipated them. The national views on
sovereignty here identified have a long history and are often strongly held. Thus, the frequently
heard suspicion in this country that this is just an attempt to protect one’s nationals from
litigation in the United States is both unfounded to the extent that the sovereignty doctrine has

22

Id. at 786-95.

23

See, e.g., BERNARD AUDIT, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 351 (4th ed. 2006); GERHARD WALTER &
TANJA DOMEJ, INTERNATIONALES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT DER SCHWEIZ 358-59 (5th ed. 2012); Hans-Jürgen Ahrens, §
363, in BERNHARD WIEZCOREK, ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG UND NEBENGESETZE 85, 91 (Rolf A. Schütze ed., 3d ed.
2010). On the history of this view see, for example, BAUMGARTNER, supra note 13, at 50-52 & 60-61.
24

Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T.
2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention].
25

See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. PRO. 37(a) & (b).

26

See, e.g., 118 BGHZ 312, 323-24 (1992) (Germany) (dictum); See also ADRIAN DÖRIG, ANERKENNUNG
428 (1998) (arguing that discovery
in violation of Swiss sovereignty should lead to non-recognition of the resulting judgment in Switzerland).
UND VOLLSTRECKUNG US-AMERIKANISCHER ENTSCHEIDUNGEN IN DER SCHWEIZ

27

See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
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long been used abroad to delimit appropriate spheres for the exercise of state power and
counterproductive if taken as a basis unilaterally to force the relevant countries to abandon their
views.28 The reaction to such unilateral attempts has often been the strengthening of those views
on sovereignty and their adamant enforcement at recognition time.29 At the same time, however,
there is indeed evidence that the sovereignty doctrine has more recently been extended in its
coverage with regard to discovery of materials in the hands of domestic parties in U.S. cases so
as to provide more extensive protection of domestic nationals from U.S. litigation as well as
domestic sovereignty from U.S. power, a matter to which I shall return shortly.30

III. Public Interest
The discussion of recognition requirements both in the cases and in the academic
literature of most nations today focuses primarily on the purpose of protecting the losing party in
the foreign litigation from the application of laws and procedures that fail to meet a minimum
threshold of fairness.31 However, there is also a larger public interest that may play a significant
role in fashioning those recognition requirements and in the way they are applied in practice. The
sovereignty concerns just discussed can be seen as a distinct and important subgroup of this
public interest, which is multifaceted and includes a number of different concerns. The most
obvious manifestation of such a public interest resides in recognition requirements that were set
up at least partly to protect such a public interest. For instance, the only intended purpose of the
reciprocity requirement, where it is still in place, is to force foreign jurisdictions with less liberal
recognition regimes to change their ways.32 Any benefits that accrue to the party opposing

28

Cf., e.g., BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 18, at 917 (“Why is it that foreign states object to unilateral
extraterritorial U.S. discovery of evidence located on their territory? Is it simply because they want to protect local
companies and nationals from liability to foreign plaintiffs?”); ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR REASONABLENESS 229 (1996) (“I have long wondered how the concept of
sovereignty crept into the subjects here discussed … Is it really pertinent to … the procurement of evidence for
purposes of discovery or trial?”); Brief for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amici
Curiae, at 22, 23, Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. 522 (No. 85-1695) (suggesting that
assertions of judicial sovereignty “often have an abstract quality and do little, in and of themselves, to elucidate the
substantive foreign interests at stake” and thus that “assertions of 'judicial sovereignty' may simply illustrate a
foreign nation's desire to protect its nationals from liability”).
29

See, e.g., Baumgartner, Transnational Litigation, supra note 9, at 1334 & 1338-40.

30

See infra text accompanying notes 67-68.

31

See, e.g., supra, note 8 and accompanying text; GEIMER & SCHÜTZE, supra note 7, at 1367-79.

32

See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS:
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE §7 cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft 2005); MARTINY, supra note 10, at
537; Whether, in fact, the reciprocity requirement has been able to serve that purpose in the two centuries or more
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recognition are purely incidental to this public interest in pressuring foreign jurisdictions.33
Similarly, the public policy exception is at least partly designed to protect the recognition state’s
public interest.34 Consider, for example, older cases in which foreign judgments were held to
violate public policy because they enforced a contract that resulted in a violation of the
recognition state’s weapons control legislation or its currency exchange regulations.35
Moreover, the public interest pursued may appear in the form of a policy to provide the
party from the recognition state with special protection from litigation abroad. In some countries,
this policy is at least partly traceable to 19th-century nationalism, which reinvigorated the
concept that individuals should have both the privilege and the obligation to be subject to the
laws and procedures of the country of which they are nationals, no matter where they may be.36
In other nations, the idea is much older.37 The purpose, however, remains the same: As opposed
to recognition requirements that are in place to protect the litigants from substandard foreign
proceedings or substantive laws, the idea here is to protect the domestic party from litigation
abroad or from the application of foreign law irrespective of fairness in a given case. This is
particularly evident in the area of personal jurisdiction. In France, for example, the Code Civil of
1804 contains both a provision that was soon interpreted by the predecessor of the Cour de
cassation to permit French nationals to sue foreigners in France in most cases and a provision
that was interpreted to permit any French defendant in foreign litigation to oppose the
recognition of the ensuing foreign judgment in France unless the defendant had either consented

that it has been on the books in some countries is an empirical question that still needs to be answered. Cf., e.g.,
MARTINY, supra note 10, at 575 (noting unresolved debate in Germany on this question).
33

The reciprocity requirement consequently may end up protecting the foreign, rather than the domestic
party of the recognition state in a particular case. See, e.g., Rolf A. Schütze, § 328, in BERNHARD WIEZCOREK,
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG UND NEBENGESETZE 450, 478 (Rolf A. Schütze, ed., 2d ed. 2007).
34

See, e.g., MARTINY, supra note 10, at 456-58.

35

See, e.g., Kammergericht München, decision of Dec. 6, 1955, reproduced in 7 WIRTSCHAFT UND
WETTBEWERB 261 (1957) (Germany); Reichsgericht, decision of Jan. 25, 1921, reproduced in 14 WARN. RESPR. 34
(1921) (Germany). See also WALTER & DOMEJ, supra note 23, at 433 (referring to a foreign judgment enforcing a
contract for the delivery of war weaponry in violation of Switzerland’s weapons control legislation as an example of
a clear violation of Swiss public policy).
36

See, e.g., FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 41-42 (special ed., 2005);
ERWIN RIEZLER, INTERNATIONALES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT UND FREMDENRECHT 78 (1949); Ralf Michaels, The New
European Choice of Law Revolution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1607, 1614-15 (2008).
37

For example, the protection of Swiss domiciliaries from foreign judgments against them, see infra note
42 and accompanying text, goes back to the beginning of the Swiss Confederacy and to one of its main concerns –
the guarantee for its citizens of a judge from among their own as opposed to the Habsburg vassals and the bishops of
the Catholic church to which they had been subjected in the past. See, e.g., EMIL SCHURTER & HANS FRITZSCHE,
DAS ZIVILPROZESSRECHT DES BUNDES 5-24 (1924).

10

to the foreign court’s jurisdiction in advance or entered a general appearance.38 The Cour de
cassation finally abandoned the latter interpretation in a case from 2006,39 thus permitting the
enforcement of foreign, including U.S., judgments against French nationals on the basis of the
same jurisdictional grounds as foreign judgments against foreigners – that is, when there was a
significant connection between the litigation and the rendering state.40 Similar limitations,
however, are still in place in England and in Switzerland. In England, foreign in personam
judgments can generally be recognized only when the defendant was present within the
rendering state at the time of service or if it agreed to the court’s jurisdiction.41 And in
Switzerland, foreign in personam judgments against Swiss domiciliaries are recognized only if
the defendant consented to jurisdiction, although there are a number of exceptions.42
A similar purpose of protecting the recognition state’s nationals or domiciliaries can be
served by a choice of law test, where it still exists. This test usually proscribes recognition if the
rendering court failed to apply certain substantive laws of the recognition state that would have
been applied by a court in the recognition state and that, in effect, often would have granted
greater protection to the defendant from the recognition state.43 While the French Cour de
cassation has recently followed the suggestion of many French commentators to abolish such a
choice of law test,44 it remains a serious obstacle to the recognition of foreign judgments against
Portuguese nationals, including U.S. judgments, in Portugal.45

38

See Code Civil Arts. 14 & 15; Kevin M. Clermont & John R.B. Palmer, French Article 14 Jurisdiction,
Viewed from the United States, in DE TOUS HORIZONS, MÉLANGES XAVIER BLANC-JOUVAN 473, 480-83 (2005);
Catherine Kessedjian, France, in RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 14, at 185, 193-94.
39

See Prieur v. de Montenach, Cass. civ. 1ère, May 23, 2006, Bull., I, N°254, N°04-12777.

40

See, e.g., Gilles Cuniberti, The Liberalization of the French Law of Foreign Judgments, 56 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 931, 933 & 935-36 (2007).
41

For corporations, this requires the conducting of business at a fixed place, or through an agent who has a
fixed place, within the rendering forum. The defendant can agree to the court’s jurisdiction either by means of a
forum selection clause or by entering a general appearance. See, e.g., RICHARD FENTIMAN, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL LITIGATION 697-702 (2010).
42

See Private International Law Act, art. 149 (Switz.). The exceptions include judgments based on
counterclaims by Swiss domiciliaries; claims arising from the operation of a Swiss business’s branch office in the
rendering state; claims by consumers domiciled in the rendering state who had bought the Swiss domiciliary’s
product there or on the basis of advertising in the rendering state; as well as a number of claims in the areas of
family law and successions. See id., arts. 26(d), 50, 58, 65, 70, 73, 84, 96, 120(1) & 149(2).
43

See, e.g., Walter & Baumgartner, supra note 14, at 32.

44

See Cornelissen v. Avianca Inc., Cass. civ. 2de, Feb. 20, 2007, Bull., I, N°68, N°05-14.082; Cuniberti,
supra note 40, at 937-39.
45

Technically, judgments against Portuguese nationals that did not apply more favorable Portuguese law
even though Portuguese choice of law rules would have so required, are subjected to a review on the merits. See,
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IV. Subtle Changes to Recognition Doctrine in Response to U.S. Litigation
While these more blatant forms of protecting domestic litigants have tended to disappear
ever so slowly, however, other, more subtle, attempts to protect one’s own nationals, national
sovereignty, and domestic legal system have emerged specifically in response to litigation in the
United States. Litigation in the United States has long been viewed as a dangerously costly and
widely unpredictable proposition abroad.46 Some damage awards can be many multiples of what
would be available elsewhere;47 discovery can be considerably more extensive, intrusive, and
expensive;48 the power of judges, including their power to sanction, is breathtaking from a civil
law perspective;49 the availability of class actions and comparatively modest pleading
requirements appear to encourage lawsuits that need not be well supported by existing law; the
rarity of trials can lead to (settlement) outcomes mostly based on a shadow of a shadow – or,
more succinctly, on the perceived views of the judge and the negotiating savvy of the relevant
attorneys;50 and the American rule of costs ensures that the resulting costs are incurred no matter

e.g., Carlos Manuel Ferreira Da Silva, Portugal, in RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 14, at 465, 48081.
46

As Lord Denning famously quipped, “[a]s a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the
United States. If he can get his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune.” Smith Kline & French Labs Ltd. v.
Bloch, [1983] 2 All E.R. 72, 74 (Denning, J.). See also Baumgartner, Transnational Litigation, supra note 9, at
1320-21 (reporting that “the published reports of three [U.S.] cases [in Germany] between 1978 and 1981 brought
home to a larger audience of German lawyers the perceived realities of some aspects of U.S. law that in-house
counsel of German companies had long lamented: large, from German standards virtually inconceivable, damage
awards handed down by unpredictable juries; expensive, party-driven discovery with comparatively immense scope
and scant protection of trade and business secrets; and a willingness of at least some U.S. courts to enforce their
procedural rules transnationally in the face of sovereignty objections by the foreign governments involved”).
47

See, e.g., Castanho v. Brown & Root (U.K.) Ltd., [1980] 1 W.L.R. 833, 859 (Shaw, J.) (estimating that
“in the United States the scale of damages for injuries of the magnitude sustained by the plaintiff is something in the
region of ten times what is regarded as appropriate by … the courts of [England]”).
48

See, e.g., BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 18, at 910-12; ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & PETER MURRAY,
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 167 (2d ed. 2007); David Gerber, Extraterritorial Discovery and the Conflict of
Procedural Systems: Germany and the United States, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 745, 748-69 (1986).
49

See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER, supra note 13, at 85-86; HAIMO SCHACK, INTERNATIONALES
ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHT 321 (3d ed. 2002) (speaking of „draconian sanctions“).
50

On both of these points combined, see, e.g., Samuel P. Baumgartner, Human Rights and Civil Litigation
in United States Courts: The Holocaust-Era Cases, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 835, 843-46 (2002) [hereinafter Baumgartner
Human Rights and Civil Litigation]; Paul Oberhammer, Deutsche Grundrechte und die Zustellung USamerikanischer Klagen im Rechtshilfeweg, 24 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALES PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS 40,
42-43 (2004).
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what the merits of the claim. The U.S. Supreme Court has pulled the rug from under some of the
doctrines giving rise to these views in recent cases by imposing a plausibility requirement on
pleadings,51 rendering class certification considerably more difficult,52 and outlawing so-called
foreign-cubed securities class actions,53 among other things.54 But in this context, perception is
more important than reality. Hence, it should not be surprising that foreign defendants caught in
U.S. litigation would attempt to get their home courts to consider any resulting judgment to be
non-recognizable. What is perhaps more surprising is that courts in countries with otherwise
relatively liberal recognition regimes have occasionally complied, and they have done so not
only with case-specific decisions but also with subtle changes in recognition doctrine that tend to
negatively affect certain types of U.S. judgments. One might be tempted to think that this is just
another manifestation of the type of parochialism that led to the outright protection of nationals
or domiciliaries discussed above.55 But things are more complicated, and I suggest that the
reasons for these developments need to be understood by those in the United States who consider
the adoption of federal legislation on the recognition of foreign judgments as well as those who
consider further treaty negotiations at The Hague.
1. State Power
If we look more closely, then, it appears that there are four main reasons that explain why
foreign courts have sometimes adopted broader interpretations of their recognition requirements
so as to protect domestic litigants, national sovereignty, and the domestic legal system from the
effects of litigation in the United States: power politics – or the perception thereof; significant
differences in legal and procedural culture; information asymmetries regarding those differences;

51

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-84 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-

63 (2007).
52

See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550-51 (2011) (holding that the requirement in
Rule 23(a)(2) that there be “questions of law or fact common to the class” for class certification means that the
plaintiffs’ “claim must depend on a common contention [which, in turn] must be of such a nature that it is capable of
class-wide resolution – which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to
the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke” and that “[a] party seeking class certification … must be
prepared to prove that [the requirements of Rule 23 are in fact met]”).
53

See Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010) (the term “foreign cubed”
refers to class actions brought by foreigners against a foreign corporation over shares of stock bought on a foreign
exchange).
54

See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, International Civil Litigation in U.S. Courts: Becoming a Paper Tiger?,
33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 663, 663-64 (2012) (arguing that the premise that “German and other foreign companies need
protection against litigation in United States courts [] may be on the cutting edge of obsolescence”) [hereinafter
Burbank, Paper Tiger].
55

See supra text accompanying notes 36-45.
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and the expressed preferences of relevant individuals and groups. The United States is a
powerful country, economically as well as militarily. Thus, U.S. courts have not had occasion to
worry too much about potential international repercussions of their decisions in transnational
litigation; and where they have worried, the real concerns have usually been federalism and
separation of powers.56 Similarly, in reforming the provisions on transnational service of process
and discovery in 1963 and 1994, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were more
interested in providing U.S. litigants with the flexibility of means they may need to proceed in
transnational cases than in taking seriously foreign sovereignty concerns.57 There are, of course,
other reasons to explain this behavior, and U.S. power may not even be on the minds of most
U.S. judges who decide cases involving parties, witnesses, or evidence from abroad.58 The
important thing is, however, that decisions of U.S. courts in this area have sometimes been
viewed abroad as an outgrowth of the United States’ political power.59 If one combines the
political power of the United States with the power of U.S. judges and the power of the – from a
foreign perspective enormous – costs of litigation in this country, it should be possible to
understand why foreigners have viewed U.S. decisions in transnational litigation that celebrate
U.S. law and U.S. justice over foreign sovereignty concerns as yet another instance in which the
United States is flexing its muscle.60 This (perceived) assertion of power does not come without
costs, however. I have elsewhere explored how decisions by lower U.S. courts in the late 1970s

56

See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725-28 (2004); American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420-29 (2003); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432-41 (1968); Banco National de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416-37 (1964).
57

See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural Law for International Civil
Litigation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 112-24 (Summer 1994).
58

I have elsewhere tried to develop the reasons for American unilateralism in transnational litigation more
generally. See BAUMGARTNER, supra note13, at 21-45. Cf. also David Golove, Human Rights Treaties and the U.S.
Constitution, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 579, 579 (2002) (claiming that “Americans … are accustomed to thinking that our
legal system … provides a model that other nations would be well advised to emulate. … In contrast, many
Americans are apt to be far less comfortable with the notion that when it comes to justice, we may have something
to learn from other nations”).
59

See, e.g., SCHACK, supra note 49, at 319 (suggesting that “politically and economically, [the judicial
conflict between U.S. courts and Europe in transnational litigation] is about blocking U.S. assertions of power”);
Burkhard Hess, Aktuelle Brennpunkte des transatlantischen Justizkonflikts, 50 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 897, 905
(2005) (observing that a struggle for power between the United States and European Union states explains the
conflict in trans-Atlantic judicial relations); Rolf Stürner, Der Justizkonflikt zwischen U.S.A. und Europa, in DER
JUSTIZKONFLIKT MIT DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON AMERIKA 1, 35-43 (Walther J. Habscheid ed., 1986)
(attributing U.S. approaches to transnational litigation to U.S. hegemony and exploring the reasons for that
hegemony).
60

Not surprisingly, foreign resentment has been particularly strong where litigation in U.S. courts has been
combined with actual pressure from the federal and state governments against the foreign defendants involved. See,
e.g., Baumgartner, Human Rights and Civil Litigation, supra note 50, at 846-49.
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and early 1980s that paid little attention to German sovereignty concerns changed the attitude of
courts, commentators, and government officials in Germany from one unreceptive to German
industry requests for protection from the effects of U.S. litigation to one favoring protection not
only of German industry, but also of German sovereignty, and the German legal system.61 The
recognition of U.S. judgments is an area where such a perceived need for protection can be put to
work, and there is evidence that this is indeed what has happened.62
Thus, for example, the German Bundesgerichtshof has indicated in dictum, and
commentators in other countries have suggested, that U.S. discovery in violation of the
recognition state’s notions of sovereignty may lead to the non-recognition of the emanating U.S.
judgment.63 This may not only include cases in which discovery clearly occurred on the territory
of the recognition state, such as by conducting a deposition,64 an inspection of property, or a
physical or mental examination in that state,65 but also cases in which a non-party from the
recognition state was requested to attend a deposition in the United States or to present
documents from the recognition state for inspection in the United States without processing that
request through diplomatic channels or, where applicable, the Hague Evidence Convention.66
Indeed, in an effort to protect their own domiciliaries and their national sovereignty from the
power of U.S. courts, the governments of Germany, France, and Switzerland in submissions to
the U.S. Supreme Court in the Aerospatiale case, expanded their traditional understanding of
sovereignty in this context to argue that even requests directed at foreign parties to attend a
deposition in the United States or to produce documents for inspection here would violate their
sovereignty if not processed through the Hague Evidence Convention channels.67 Since this last

61

See Baumgartner, Transnational Litigation, supra note 9, at 1318-38.

62

See id. at 1338-44.

63

See supra note 26 and accompanying text.

64

It is less clear whether this includes depositions by telephone, video link, or other electronic means that
permit questioning of deponents abroad by attorneys located in the United States. One view is that the deposition
still takes place on the territory within which the witness is located and thus implicates local sovereignty the same
way as a deposition actually taking place there. See, e.g., Alexander R. Markus, Neue Entwicklungen bei der
internationalen Rechtshilfe in Zivil- und Handelssachen, __ SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND
FINANZMARKTRECHT 65, 77-79 (2002).
65

In Switzerland, the Supreme Court has held that this includes a lawyer interviewing persons on Swiss
territory for purposes of drawing up an affidavid upon information and belief for use in a foreign (in this case an
Australian) proceeding. Acting in this way not only represents a violation of national sovereignty but also a federal
felony under Article 271(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code. See BGE 114 IV 128 (1988).
66

See, e.g., DIETER LEIPOLD, LEX FORI, SOUVERÄNITÄT, DISCOVERY: GRUNDFRAGEN DES
INTERNATIONALEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS 63-64 (1988).
67

Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae at 2-3, 13-14, Société Nationale Industrielle
Aérospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987) (No. 85-1695); Brief of the Government of
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argument really pushes the boundaries of the traditional understanding of judicial sovereignty in
these countries, it is less than obvious that such a discovery request to a party, too, may lead to
non-recognition of an ensuing U.S. judgment.68 But the concern about the power, including the
judicial power, of the United States should be clear.
However, expanding their traditional view of when the extraterritorial taking of evidence
violates their national sovereignty is not the only way in which some countries have responded to
the refusal of U.S. courts to take their traditional sovereignty concerns seriously in transnational
litigation. Upon closer examination, one may also wonder why so many countries have
continued to abide by their traditional views on sovereignty with regard to service of process and
the gathering of evidence abroad in the first place, especially since commentators in some of
these countries have noted that the letter rogatory process is slow and not always certain to yield
the needed evidence for their own courts,69 and that the notion of service of process as a
governmental act that needs the consent of the requested state to be effective there ill serves
defendants from the requested state if foreign courts then resort to constructive service or service
on an imaginary agent of the defendant in the forum state to be able to proceed with the
litigation.70 To the lawmakers and judges in these countries, apparently, retaining their traditional
views on sovereignty has been important to counteract U.S. power in transnational litigation.

Switzerland as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2-3, 8, Aérospatiale (No. 85-1695); Brief of Amicus
Curiae the Republic of France in Support of Petitioners at 3, 14-16, Aérospatiale (No. 85-1695).
68

See, e.g., SCHACK, supra note 49, at 310 (noting that, contrary to the views the German government has
expressed in U.S. litigation, the forum court, including a German court in a proceeding pending in Germany, can
order a foreign party to appear in the forum state to testify and arguing that an order to a foreign party to produce
documents for inspection in the forum state is unproblematic under international law). But see PETER SCHLOSSER,
DER JUSTIZKONFLIKT ZWISCHEN DEN USA UND EUROPA 25 (1985); Stürner, supra note 59, at 26 (both arguing that
the sheer intensity of discovery requested from a party could trigger German sovereignty concerns); LEIPOLD, supra
note 67, at 64-66 (arguing that discovery orders directed at German parties implicate German sovereignty if backed
by impending criminal sanctions, including criminal contempt sanctions).
69

See, e.g., SCHACK, supra note 49, at 313-14; WALTER & DOMEJ, supra note 23, at 359-60. Within the
European Union, these concerns have led to some improvements on the traditional letter rogatory process. First,
rather than requesting the taking of evidence by a court in another EU member state through a central authority, a
court in an EU member state can directly request its counterpart to take the needed evidence. If it is not against
fundamental principles of the requested state, the forum court can also request to travel to the requested state to take
the evidence itself as long as it does not need to use coercive measures to do so. See Council Regulation (EC) No.
1206/2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial
matters, 2001 O.J. (L 174) 1, arts. 2 & 17.
70

See, e.g., SCHACK, supra note 49, at 257-59; WALTER & DOMEJ, supra note 23, at 361-62. Not
surprisingly, then, the European Union’s new Service Regulation permits service of process within the European
Union not only by a streamlined letter of request procedure, but also by registered mail with acknowledgment of
receipt and by direct service from “a person interested in a judicial proceeding” to the “judicial officers, officials, or
other competent persons of the Member State addressed, where such direct service is permitted under the law of that
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Note that I am not arguing here that the Supreme Court got the treaty interpretation
wrong in the Aerospatiale and Schlunk decisions,71 nor that these decisions (and many more by
lower U.S. courts) did not involve – sometimes difficult – questions relating to the authority of
treaties and customary international law vis-à-vis domestic statutes, court-made rules, and
common law – state and federal – under the U.S. Constitution, the Rules Enabling Act,72 and the
Rules of Decision Act.73 Instead, my point is that when U.S. courts and lawmakers refuse to
incur sovereignty costs to the United States by seriously considering the sovereignty concerns of
other nations in cross-border cases, they may assume, perhaps because of U.S. power, that this
can be done without further consequences. If so, however, they may forget that power is a twoedged sword and that by doing so, they have just incurred costs to U.S. litigants down the line.
Thus, for example, Justice O’Connor in her opinion in Schlunk correctly pointed out to U.S.
plaintiffs that service of process outside of the channels of the Hague Service Convention may
render the judgment in that particular case unenforceable abroad.74 What Justice Stevens and the
majority in Aerospatiale may not have realized, however, is that the Court’s opinion, by not
engaging the foreign claim that certain discovery requests outside the channels of the Hague

Member State.” See Regulation (EC) No. 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November
2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters, and
repealing Council Regulation (EC) No. 1348/2000, 2007 O.J. (L 324) 97, arts. 4, 14 & 15. The version of this
Regulation that was passed seven years earlier had still permitted Member states to declare that they would not
allow service by mail and direct service under Articles 14 & 15, and a number of Member states had made such
declarations. See Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 of 29 May 2000 on the service in the Member States of
judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters, O.J. (L 160) 37, arts. 14 & 15; Consolidated
Version, Information communicated by Member States under Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000
of 29 May 2000 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial
matters, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/judicialatlascivil/html/pdf/vers_consolide_en_1348.pdf (last
visited: Nov. 1, 2012).
71

Volkswagenwerk AG v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988); Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v.
United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987). Cf. PERMANENT BUREAU OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PRACTICAL HANDBOOK ON THE OPERATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 15 NOVEMBER
1965 ON THE SERVICE ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS
16-21 (3d ed. 2006) (concluding that the Schlunk decision’s interpretation of Article 1 of the Hague Service
Convention that the question of when a judicial or extrajudicial document needs to be served abroad is to be
determined by the law of the requesting state is supported by the negotiating history of the Convention, the practice
of courts in several member states, and by the views of the delegates of most member states).
72

28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-74.
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28 U.S.C. § 1652. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1456,
1478-97 (1991) (reviewing GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS (1989)) [hereinafter Burbank, World]
74

486 U.S. 694, at 706.
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Evidence Convention violate their sovereignty and thus customary international law, might make
the recognition of all U.S. judgments more difficult in some countries in the future.75
2. Fundamental Differences in Procedural Systems and Information Asymmetries
This discussion of foreign sovereignty concerns brings me to the next two factors I
suggest have influenced foreign doctrine on the recognition of U.S. judgments – fundamental
differences between the procedural systems of the United States and other countries and lack of
sufficient knowledge about those differences among many of the relevant players in transnational
litigation. The differences between U.S. law and the U.S. litigation system on the one hand and
the laws of other countries on the other, to the extent they are known to the recognition court,
may seem to be overwhelming.76 For instance, as Professor Lowenfeld noted some time ago with
regard to discovery, “[t]he rest of the world … thinks U.S. lawyers … start lawsuits … on
minimal bases, and rely on their adversaries … to build their cases for them,” while “Americans
… have sometimes tended to think of the rest of the world as engaged in a massive conspiracy of
concealment masquerading as privacy … and secrecy laws intended to draw corporate and
sovereign veils over all kinds of evil, from drug dealing to tax evasion to commercial fraud to
manufacture of defective products.”77 Foreign recognition courts may thus be tempted to
conclude that some of these differences amount to a public policy violation, although many
foreign authorities correctly point out that these differences alone cannot by themselves be
reason to refuse to accord a U.S. judgment recognition.78
More important, therefore, is the fact that lack of knowledge about many of these
differences and underlying assumptions can lead to frustrated expectations. For instance, the
view that orders to foreign non-parties to appear in the forum state to testify or to provide

75

Similarly, the academics chiefly responsible for the 1963 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and parallel 1964 federal legislation recognized that, by permitting plaintiffs to serve process in violation
of the law of the receiving state, the recognition and enforcement of an ensuing U.S. judgment may be put in danger.
See, e.g., Benjamin Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-63, 77 HARV. L. REV. 601,
635-36 (1964). But rather than realizing that this might cause trouble for all U.S. litigants down the road, these
academics assumed that, to the contrary, the foreign states in question would ultimately see the light and follow the
lead of the United States. See, e.g., Hans Smit, International Litigation under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L.
REV. 1015, 1018-19 (1965).
76

See supra text accompanying notes 46-54.
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Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Some Reflections on Transnational Discovery, 8 J. COMP. BUS. & CAP. MARKET
L. 419, 419-20 (1986).
78

See, e.g., 118 BGHZ 312 at 323 (holding that the presence of U.S. discovery alone does not render a U.S.
judgment unenforceable in Germany); SCHACK, supra note 49, at 371; JOACHIM ZEKOLL, US-AMERIKANISCHES
PRODUKTHAFTPFLICHTRECHT VOR DEUTSCHEN GERICHTEN 137-41 (1987).
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documents for inspection there implicate the foreign country’s sovereignty and thus need to
proceed through diplomatic channels or the channels set up by an applicable treaty was relatively
unproblematic as long as continental European countries applied it primarily among themselves,
that is, among countries with similar views on the matter. Once European businesses
increasingly found themselves to be defendants in U.S. litigation in the 1970s and 1980s,
however, it became clear that U.S. courts had little patience for these views of sovereignty. The
reason was not only a lack of understanding of the very different views on these matters in
continental Europe. It is also true that the mechanics of U.S. discovery and its underlying
purposes are to some degree incompatible with these continental European views on sovereignty,
which lead to the application of the requested state’s procedural law in executing a letter
rogatory (or a letter of request under the Hague Evidence Convention).79 Worse, Article 23 of the
Hague Evidence Convention permits a member state to “declare that it will not execute Letters of
Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in
Common Law countries.”80 Many of the Convention’s member states have indeed made such a
declaration,81 although some have since narrowed its scope to what they view as fishing
expeditions.82 They have done so because many of the relevant players in the respective civil law
countries were unfamiliar with the separation of what in their jurisdictions is a single process of
producing evidence during the main hearing into a pretrial evidence-gathering process
(discovery) and a process of presenting the unearthed evidence to the trier of fact (trial) in the
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See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 24, art. 9(1). At least under the Hague Evidence
Convention, the requesting state can request the use of “a special method or procedure to be followed, unless this is
incompatible with the internal law of the State of execution” and the executing state has to use the methods of
compulsion available in internal proceedings. Id. arts. 9(2) & 10. But application of the law of the requested state’s
law may mean that the witnesses will be questioned by the judge upon questions previously suggested by the
attorneys and that the requested state’s much broader privileges may apply. See, e.g., Baumgartner, Transnational
Litigation, supra note 9, at 1324-25.
80

Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 24, art. 23.
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Of the 57 member states of the Convention, all but 15 currently maintain a reservation under Article 23.
See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention of 18 March, 1970 on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, Status Table, available at:
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=82 (last visited: October 12, 2012)
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Of the 42 member states with Article 23 reservations, ten (China, Cyprus, Estonia, Korea, Mexico, The
Netherlands, Romania Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela) limit their reservations to certain aspects
of document discovery, mostly to what they consider fishing expeditions. See id. Thus, for example the reservation
of the United Kingdom is limited to letters of request that
require[] a person: (a) to state what documents relevant to the proceedings to which the Letter of
Request relates are, or have been, in his possession, custody or power; or (b) to produce any
documents other than particular documents specified in the Letter of Request as being documents
appearing to the requested court to be, or to be likely to be, in his possession, custody, or power.
Declaration and Reservation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, id.
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United States.83 These individuals simply assumed that, with an Article 23 reservation, they
could limit wide-ranging discovery requests while U.S. courts could always make more
particularized requests for evidence from their territory once trial was underway and the scope of
the evidentiary inquiry would be in sharper focus. This view, of course, failed to take into
account both the fact that discovery in this country is conducted by the parties’ attorneys before
trial and that the need for a concentrated trial would make trial interruptions to obtain evidence
from abroad impracticable.84
Lawmakers, judges, and academics from those countries, making assumptions on the
basis of their judge-centered evidence-gathering process,85 thus failed to realize for quite some
time (and some of them still do not understand today) that their approach to responding to U.S.
letters of request under the Hague Evidence Convention has very considerably limited the
usefulness of the Convention’s letter-of-request procedure for litigants in the United States.86
Thus, lack of knowledge about the very different litigation system across the Atlantic Ocean and
the assumptions underlying it not only led U.S. judges to dismiss foreign sovereignty concerns a
bit too cavalierly,87 but also produced wrong assumptions in continental Europe about how U.S.
courts would deal with transnational service and discovery. Hence, what has appeared abroad as
an exercise of U.S. power politics, is to some degree a sensible reaction to unrealistic
expectations among Europeans. That has not prevented these frustrated expectations from
becoming the source of limitations to the recognition of U.S. judgments as described above,
however.88
3. Preferences of Individuals and Groups
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The final factor that has helped shape recognition doctrine with regard to U.S. judgments
is the expressed preference of individuals and groups. I am not referring here to the efforts that
judgment debtors inevitably undertake to prevent a U.S. or other judgment against them to be
recognized and enforced abroad in a particular case. Instead, I suggest that there have been
efforts by individuals and groups more generally to change recognition doctrine so as to render
the recognition and enforcement of U.S. judgments more difficult. An important portion of this
consists of pressure by interest groups. Foreign manufacturers selling their products into the U.S.
market in particular seem to be taken aback at times by the very different law and litigation
system they inevitably encounter here. As a result, they have repeatedly tried to achieve
protection from U.S. litigation at home through trade groups and in other ways.89 To the extent
that law makers, government officials, and judges in their home countries tend to have little
knowledge about the U.S. litigation system, these industry groups have been able to make use of
the shock value of horror stories from cases real and imagined about litigation in the United
States.90 Businesses selling their products in the United States and their attorneys are thus able to
use superior knowledge about U.S. law and practice to obtain changes to the domestic
recognition regime that would not perhaps occur if the domestic actors had a good sense of the
true picture of the litigation landscape in the United States – another case of information
asymmetries playing a role. Moreover, where such efforts to obtain protection from U.S.
litigation combine with perceptions that U.S. courts and lawmakers are using litigation procedure
as a source of power politics,91 they fall on particularly fertile ground. I have elsewhere
described the efforts by German industry representatives, for example, to gain protection from
U.S. litigation by the German government and German courts in the late 1970s and early
1980s.92 These efforts remained without success until a number of high-profile cases brought
home to a larger German audience just how different U.S. law and procedure can be and until it
became clear that a number of U.S. courts were unwilling to seriously consider the German
sovereignty concerns regarding service of process and discovery discussed above. Before that,
industry complaints were not taken too seriously, presumably on the grounds that those who
operate in the U.S. market should not be surprised that U.S. law and procedure is brought to bear
on their activity and that U.S. law and procedure cannot possibly be as bad as described. But
these industry complaints also were not taken too seriously until the relevant government
officials, judges, and one particularly influential group in the German legal system – law
professors – began to perceive a problem for the country, its legal system, and its sovereignty
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that went beyond simple industry interests.93 Thus, industry groups are not the only ones
potentially influencing doctrine in this context. The preferences of other important players in the
making and application of the relevant law also play an important role.
As an area where preferences of groups and individuals have affected recognition
doctrine in favor of local industry, consider punitive damages. Traditionally, there is no parallel
to punitive damages in the legal systems of continental Europe. Continental legal scholarship
prides itself on having been able to untangle, during the Enlightenment period, the civil aspects
of tort and contract law from the criminal sanctions they entailed in Roman law, so that the law
of damages in contracts, torts, and other aspects of private law today is about compensation and
restitution, while criminal law deals with punishment and deterrence.94 This approach, to the
continental legal mind, is considerably more sophisticated than the Roman law approach from
which it sprang. Add to that the concern in some countries that awards of punitive damages
implicate constitutional protections against the imposition of criminal punishment, such as the
rule that the crime be clearly defined by statute ahead of time and the rule against double
jeopardy.95 Does this mean that the imposition of punitive damages in the United States is so
repugnant from the point of view of continental doctrine as to amount to a public policy
violation? The problem with this line of argument is that penal elements have not been as clearly
absent from continental doctrines of private law as some would have it. Continental European
legal systems have frequently allowed for the parties to a contract to agree to a sum of money to
be paid as punishment in case of a breach, for example.96 And the courts in a number of countries
consider the defendant’s culpability when assessing damages for pain and suffering.97 Moreover,
punitive damages may cover costs in the United States, such as attorney’s fees, that the
defendant would have to pay in the continental system as a result of the loser-pays rule. Indeed,
the prospect of punitive damages may make a claim economically viable to a U.S. attorney
operating under a contingent fee arrangement when economic viability is not an issue for a
93
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plaintiff with a solid claim looking for an attorney in a system with a loser pays rule. Partly for
these reasons and because, as Justice Cardozo famously put it, “we are not so provincial as to say
that every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home,”98 early
evaluations in Germany, for example, cautiously concluded that U.S. punitive damage awards do
not automatically violate German public policy.99
This assessment changed as German industry groups increased attempts to achieve
protection from U.S. judgments, pointing to several outsized jury awards of punitive damages.
The assessment also changed as a result of an increasing realization in German legal circles that
U.S. courts did not seem to take German sovereignty concerns with regard to service of process
and discovery too seriously. Academic commentary thus increasingly argued that U.S. punitive
damage awards violate German public policy, at least to the extent they do not include an
amount compensating for matters that would be covered by a German judgment in a similar
case.100 In 1992, the German Bundesgerichtshof held that punitive damages “of not insignificant
size” violated German public policy and that the punitive portion of a U.S. judgment thus could
not be enforced in the country.101 Similar arguments were made in other European countries and
considered by their courts. In 1982, for instance, a court in the Swiss canton of St. Gallen refused
to enforce an entire U.S. judgment because it included a punitive award.102 On the other hand,
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the district court of the canton of Basel City held a judgment from a California court in a contract
case to be enforceable under Swiss law even though it included a $50,000 award for punitive
damages in addition to $120,060 in compensatory damages. The court reasoned, among other
things, that the punitive award in this case had the same effect as an unjust enrichment claim
under Swiss law and that it was not excessively high.103
German academic commentary on punitive damages and concerns for local industry
became influential in other countries as well, both inside and outside of continental Europe. The
matter was also discussed at length during the negotiations for a world-wide convention on
jurisdiction and the recognition of judgments at The Hague throughout the 1990s.104 This
discussion resulted in Article 11 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements of
2005, which provides that “[r]ecognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if, and to
the extent that, the judgment awards damages, including exemplary and punitive damages, that
do not compensate a party for actual loss or harm suffered.”105 In 1997, the Supreme Court of
Japan followed the German Supreme Court in holding a U.S. punitive award to be in violation of
Japanese public policy.106 The highest civil court in Italy, the Corte di Cassazione followed suit
in a 2007 case involving a million-dollar award in a product liability case against an Italian
manufacturer of motorcycle helmets.107 And, most recently, the same French Cour de cassation
that has recently been instrumental in considerably liberalizing French recognition practice
(including for the recognition of U.S. judgments),108 too, held that a punitive award of $
1,460,000 was disproportionate to the damage actually sustained and the contractual obligations
breached – the rendering court in California had awarded $ 1,391,650.12 in compensatory
damages – and thus violated French public policy.109 However, the Court did note in dictum that
103
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“an award of punitive damages is not per se contrary to [French] public policy.”110 All of this has
happened while some commentators in Europe have pointed out that the case against punitive
damages has not been as clearly established as some would have it and that courts have
increasingly permitted punitive elements to play a role in certain aspects of determining
damages,111 and while France, Germany, and the European Union have considered adopting
punitive damages in limited settings.112
The changes in doctrine that may come about as a result of the expressed preferences of
groups and individuals in favor of protecting domestic law and parties from litigation in the
United States are frequently subtle, however. This is demonstrated by another example from
Germany. Under German law, a foreign judgment can be recognized only if the rendering court
had jurisdiction according to German rules of personal jurisdiction. One of the available German
bases of jurisdiction for these purposes if the foreign action was based on a tort claim is that the
defendant had committed the alleged tort in the rendering state or if the alleged tort had its
effects there. The factual question whether the defendant had indeed committed a tort thus
becomes doubly relevant – for the decision on the merits as well as for the decision whether the
rendering court had jurisdiction so as to permit the recognition and enforcement of its judgment
in Germany. Hence, when deciding whether to grant recognition, should the German recognition
court be able to revisit the question of whether a tort had in fact been committed? In a 1993 case
involving the recognition of a default judgment from Washington state, the German
Bundesgerichtshof held that, yes, that question is open for reconsideration at the recognition
stage in the context of a default judgment.113 The Court reasoned that, otherwise, German
defendants would be forced to defend abroad under any circumstances.114 That, in turn would
give plaintiffs an incentive to bring cases in favorable fora on trumped-up charges in the hope
that the defendant will not be able to mount an effective defense.115 The Court also reasoned that
it was perfectly legitimate for the defendant to try to avoid the high costs of litigation in the
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United States.116 This reasoning reflects what was by then a wide-spread view among German
lawyers brought about at least partly by industry stories about U.S. litigation, that, in the United
States, personal jurisdiction is easy to obtain, strike suits are widespread, and that even a
meritorious defense is an unreasonably expensive proposition. In this decision, to be sure, the
Bundesgerichtshof adopted a doctrinal approach that had been urged by a number of academic
writers for all foreign judgments (not just for judgments from the United States) and before
concerns about involvement of German industry in U.S. litigation had become an issue.117 But
given the Court’s reasoning, it is likely that efforts to protect German industry from U.S.
litigation played a role in the Court’s adopting this approach.

V. Conclusion
With all the focus in this Article on problems that U.S. judgments holders may encounter
abroad, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that there are a number of countries that quite liberally
recognize and enforce judgments from the United States. Among those countries are Germany,118
Italy,119 and, most recently, France – countries on which I have put a particular spotlight here.120
Even in Switzerland, where foreign judgments cannot generally be recognized if they were
rendered against a Swiss domiciliary (though with a number of significant exceptions), the
Supreme Court has been quite liberal in dealing with certain aspects of recognition doctrine
affecting judgments from the United States.121 I also hasten to add that the changes in recognition
doctrine resulting from efforts to protect national sovereignty, the domestic legal system, and
domestic parties in response to U.S. power, the perceived pathologies of the U.S. litigation
system, and interest group pressure have been subtle and relatively circumspect where, and to the
extent, they have taken place. My purpose here has not been, however, to assess how U.S.
judgments fare abroad. Instead, I have intentionally focused on the parts of recognition doctrine
that have generated problems for U.S. judgments holders, attempting to analyze the reasons for
these problems.
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Indeed, my finding that many of these problems arise from doctrines that attempt to
protect the sovereignty and, more generally, the public interest of the recognition state may, in
the not-so-distant future, turn out to be of only historical interest. The relevant doctrines and
underlying concerns go back to the 19th Century or earlier, and many countries have since
abandoned some or all of those doctrines.122 Perhaps, even doctrinal changes that have been
adopted specifically in reaction to litigation in the United States may be cast aside under certain
conditions in the future. For instance, since the German Bundesgerichtshof declared punitive
damages awards to be against German public policy in 1992, a number of German scholars have
argued that the case against punitives is not perhaps as clear-cut as the Court made it out to be
and that awards of such damages should be recognized in principle, although not perhaps beyond
a certain size.123 As the limited use of punitives gains currency within the European Union,124 the
Bundesgerichtshof may change its jurisprudence on this matter.
More likely, however, things will remain the same for some time to come. Countries have
been very slow in moving away from doctrines limiting the recognition and enforcement of
judgments from the United States. In the current landscape of transnational litigation, there
appears to be no incentive to liberalize the relevant recognition regime. Countries in Europe and
elsewhere have entered into extensive networks of treaties, both bilateral and multilateral,
providing for the reciprocal and liberalized recognition and enforcement of judgments with their
most important trading partners.125 Since the United States has long chosen to stay away from
such treaties, the rules applicable to judgments from the United States are the same that apply to
judgments from far-away countries with which the recognition state has limited trading
relationships and the fairness of whose legal systems tends to be more doubtful than that of the
treaty partners’.126 Thus, since relationships with most of the important trading partners are
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covered by more liberal treaties, many countries have no pressing reason to change their
recognition regime for non-treaty partners. I also suspect, but do not know, that the rules
applicable to the recognition of judgments from non-treaty partners have often been happily used
to block the effects of U.S. judgments.
Since many of the doctrinal problems encountered by U.S. judgment debtors are based on
a public interest of the recognition state, however,127 negotiating away these problems is likely to
be more challenging than if this were merely a matter of finding agreement on what represents
fair treatment of the litigants in the rendering state. Thus, finding a mutually agreeable treaty text
will require negotiators to engage their underlying jurisprudential assumptions about the proper
conduct of litigation in general and transnational litigation in particular. The U.S. delegation may
also do well to engage foreign fears about litigation in the United States. Indeed, treaty
negotiations represent an excellent opportunity to overcome the information asymmetries
discussed above and to set up mechanisms for future information exchanges.128 On the other
hand, the discussion above should also make clear that attempts to bring about better recognition
and enforcement of U.S. judgments abroad through the use of unilateral displays of U.S. power,
be it by Congressional legislation or by court decision, are likely to have the opposite effect. 129
Finally, it bears noting that I have focused here on aspects of substantive recognition
doctrine, that is, on the requirements that must be met for a judgment to be recognizable or
enforceable. For those interested in the potential problems faced by judgment holders from the
United States, another fruitful avenue of research will be to look at the procedures that apply in
obtaining a declaration of recognizability or enforceability.130 Indications are that countries vary
widely with regard to questions such as how much such a proceeding costs, who has to pay for it,
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how simple or complicated it is, how long it lasts, and whether preliminary enforcement
measures are available.131
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